Categories
Uncategorized

Rage Against The Machine, or, Up With Cheaters!

 We here at NotMakingThisUp have no vendetta
against Holman Jenkins, Jr., despite this being our second reaction to one of
his Wall Street Journal editorials in as many months.
  In fact, your editor has met him in a social
setting, and he seems like a thoroughly reasonable guy.
 But his knee-jerk,
anything-the-government-does-is-ipso-facto-wrong mindset puts him in the
repeated position of defending individuals like MF Global destroyer-in-chief Jon
Corzine (here) and Rajat Gupta, former Goldman Sachs board member and convicted
Raj Rajaratnam source (here), not to mention, most recently, laying into the government’s
prosecution of SAC (here).
 It’s a bizarre case of a straight-laced Wall
Street Journal writer whose favorite story line seems to be Up With Cheaters!
 Since the SAC case is still out there, we have
nothing to say about Jenkins’ knee-jerk lambasting of the Feds’ efforts to shut
the place down without seemingly having any goods on the boss of the enterprise, although
the situation at SAC (five former employees cooperating with the Feds out of eight so far charged criminally on insider
trading) recalls what a friend likes to say about these kinds of things:
“If it looks like a duck and quacks like a duck…”
 Instead, we focus on the biggest whopper in
Jenkins’ latest rage against the machine: that the “standard rhetoric” that
“the public is cheated” by insider trading “is nonsense.”
 Here’s how he puts it:
 Under
standard rhetoric, the public is somehow cheated by all this, but the standard
rhetoric is nonsense. The public isn’t damaged because another party wants to
sell or buy….
 According to Jenkins’ fuzzy logic, somehow, the investors
who sold 175,000 shares of Goldman Sachs to Raj Rajaratnam late in the trading
day of September 23, 2008, after Rajaratnam got word from Gupta about Warren
Buffett’s $5 billion investment in Goldman—a market-moving event if ever there
was one—and thereby left a $900,000 profit on the table that Rajaratnam
pocketed for his firm after the stock soared the next day, were not “damaged”
or “somehow cheated.”
 As Zack de la Rocha would sing, “know your
enemy.”  
 And in our line of business, if not in Jenkins’s, inside traders are the enemy—not the Feds.
 Good riddance to them.
Jeff Matthews
Author “Warren Buffett’s Successor: Who It Is And Why It Matters”
(eBooks on Investing, 2013)    $2.99
Kindle Version at Amazon.com
© 2013
NotMakingThisUp, LLC              
The
content contained in this blog represents only the opinions of Mr.
Matthews.   Mr. Matthews also acts as an
advisor and clients advised by Mr. Matthews may hold either long or short
positions in securities of various companies discussed in the blog based upon
Mr. Matthews’ recommendations.  This
commentary in no way constitutes investment advice, and should never be relied
on in making an investment decision, ever. 
Also, this blog is not a solicitation of business by Mr. Matthews: all
inquiries will be ignored.  And if you
think Mr. Matthews is kidding about that, he is not.  The content herein is intended solely for the
entertainment of the reader, and the author.
Categories
Uncategorized

In Defense of Fabulous Fab

 Well it looks, thus far, like the SEC is not making much of a showing in its civil prosecution of Fabrice Tourre, the now-infamous “Fabulous Fab” of Goldman Sachs fame.  For a reminder of how, to use a highly technical legal expression, lame the government’s case seems to this virtual column, we thought it worth dusting off the following piece from those anxious, post-crisis days.— JM 

Monday, April 19, 2010

From BACCHUS to ABACUS: Exhibit A in Defense of Goldman Sachs


Let’s start by making one thing clear: we here at NotMakingThisUp harbor no particular good will towards Goldman Sachs.

In fact, not long ago we published in these virtual pages a column titled “Goldman 8, Public Zero…the Teachable Moment of Bare Escentuals (January 15).” It was a minor but explicit illumination of Goldman’s relationships with its clients—i.e. pretty much the same relationship a water moccasin has with a frog.

Loyal readers will recall that we described how Goldman Sachs first sold a total of 36 million shares of cosmetics maker Bare Escentuals (sic) to the public at prices ranging from $22.00 to $34.50. Then, after the wheels came off the proverbial track at Bare, Goldman’s crack research team slapped a “Sell” rating on the company’s stock…but not until after it had already collapsed to $13 a share.

Adding insult to injury, just a few weeks after that “Sell” rating—from Bare’s very own investment bank—sent the shares crashing, Bare Escentuals received a takeover bid for $18.20 a share.

But wait, as they say, there’s more!

Bare Escentuals then hired none other than Goldman Sachs to advise the cosmetics company on the $18.20 a share offer. Goldman, naturally, endorsed the price as fair—just weeks after its own research department had declared $13.00 as too rich a price for Goldman’s clients to pay—and received fees for doing so.

By our count, that amounted to eight ways Goldman Sachs made money on Bare Escentuals at the expense of anybody on the other side of the table.


And while we therefore do not have any particularly benign feelings towards Goldman Sachs, neither do we harbor ill-will towards the government institution which filed a complaint against that firm on Friday.

Indeed, the SEC Chairman who, in our view, pulled the teeth out of that animal under the previous administration and then flailed ineffectually while the world collapsed thanks in part to his blunders—i.e. Chris Cox—is gone, and good riddance to him. (For an entertaining and insightful look at that sordid story, read Andrew Ross Sorkin’s excellent account of the Lehman collapse, “Too Big to Fail.”)

Still, we’ve read the SEC’s complaint filed against Goldman Sachs Friday afternoon—headlines of which seemed so shocking they sent Goldman shares, and stock markets, crashing.

And while the complaint portrays yet another sordid story—the account of some really awful paper Goldman helped package and sell to a dumb German bank at the behest of a smart U.S. hedge fund manager—we think the government doesn’t have a leg to stand on.

The gist of the SEC’s complaint—and while we are not attorneys, we have been in this business a few decades and seen more than a few frauds in that time—appears to be, in part, that Goldman and an employee mislead IKB, the German bank in question, by not disclosing that John Paulson’s hedge fund had helped select the garbage Goldman was selling to IKB:

In sum, GS&Co arranged a transaction at Paulson’s request in which Paulson heavily influenced the selections of the portfolio to suit its economic interest, but failed to disclose to investors…Paulson’s role in the portfolio selection process or its adverse economic interests.

—Paragraph 3, SEC v. GOLDMAN SACHS & Co. and FABRICCE TOURRE.
Let’s leave aside the obvious howler here—since when did it become a broker’s responsibility to violate the confidentiality of its clients by disclosing the seller’s identity to the buyer?—and focus on the specifics of the SEC charge, particularly the notion that IKB would not have proceeded with the transaction had Goldman not omitted Paulson’s name from the discussion, as spelled out here:

IKB would not have invested in the transaction had it known that Paulson played a significant role in the collateral selection process while intending to take a short position in ABACUS 2007-AC1.

—Paragraph 59, SEC v. GOLDMAN SACHS & Co. and FABRICCE TOURRE.

Who, exactly, is this IKB that, if we are to believe the complaint, had been led like a lamb to slaughter by Goldman Sachs at the behest of John Paulson?
Well, IKB is short for IKB Deutsche Industriebank, and it was once a sleepy German industrial lender that, during the 2000s, made the plunge into sub-prime CDOs for the same reason so many of its peers did: it seemed like a good idea at the time.

Indeed, so good an idea did it seem, that IKB boasted of its prowess in evaluating exactly the kind of garbage the SEC is now trying to claim Goldman Sachs misled it into buying.

Far from being an unwilling pawn on the financial chess-board, IKB issued press releases about its move into the exotic world of toxic mortgage structures even as John Paulson, the genius who sold the garbage to IKB, was deciding it was time to sell the same toxic mortgage structures short.

Indeed, as far back as March, 2006—a year before the tainted transaction with Goldman Sachs—IKB issued a press release announcing the closing of a deal, chest-thumpingly-named “BACCHUS” (we are not making that up) which seems to make it very clear that IKB was not only a willing buyer, but a willing distributor of the same kind of garbage as the boys in lower Manhattan.

Here begins that press release:

IKB closes first “Bacchus” deal, strengthening its position as an asset manager for corporate loan portfolios.

[Düsseldorf, Germany, 16 March 2006] IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG has successfully concluded “Bacchus 2006-1″, a funded securitisation of acquisition financings. With this deal, IKB further strengthened its position as a leading asset manager for corporate loan portfolios. The € 400 million Collateralised Loan Obligation was arranged and placed by JP Morgan…

Bacchus, of course, was the Roman god who inspired the term “Bacchanalia.”

Call us old-fashioned, but for our part, if we had been a stodgy old-line German bank packaging securities for resale, we would have selected a more sober god to name our deals after—“Apollo,” perhaps (god of music and healing; ‘associated with light, truth and the sun’), or “Artemis” (goddess of the hunt).

Not the god of drunken orgies.

Having discovered that IKB appears to have been no babe in the CDO woods, we now submit the following document that we suggest may well suffice as “Exhibit A” in Goldman’s defense.

It is a presentation by Dr. Jörg Chittka, head of IKB investor relations, prepared for a Dresdner Kleinwort Day for Investor Relations on December 12, 2006—just a few months before the transaction in question—and it can be downloaded from the IKB web site.

Let’s flip quickly through Dr. Chittka’s “slide deck”:

“Slide 3: Highlights—Market Leader/Strong performance/Solid ratings…”
—IKB Dresdner Kleinwort IR Day 12.12.2006

Hmm, IKB would seem to be no country bumpkin. This slide informs us that, among other things, IKB is a “Specialist in long-term corporate finance” and a “Market leader in long-term corporate lending in Germany” with a market share of 13%.

“Slide 5: Focused market strategy—Specialisation(sic)/Lean sales system/Selective new business…”
—IKB Dresdner Kleinwort IR Day 12.12.2006

Sounds good! Dr. Chittka informs us that IKB has a “Rating-oriented product and price strategy,” and that “New business” is “strictly oriented to rating and margin spread.”

So how on earth did IKB end up owning a bunch of Goldman-packaged, Paulson-shorted garbage?

The next slide holds a clue, in the form of a timeline showing IKB’s history:

“Slide 6: Lines of Development

· 1924: Foundation
· 1930s: Pioneered long-term lending at fixed interest rates…
· Entering 2000s: CLO-transactions and investments in international loan portfolios”


—IKB Dresdner Kleinwort IR Day 12.12.2006

Ah, there we have it. IKB is getting into the CLO business, especially in international loan portfolios!

But what does this little German bank know from CLOs? Well, it turns out this little German bank claims to possess an advantage:

“Slide 9: Competitive edge

· High expertise in all fields of corporate finance, incl.
-rating advisory and
-industry research”
—IKB Dresdner Kleinwort IR Day 12.12.2006

There you have it: IKB claims to have “high expertise in all fields of corporate finance,” and that includes both “rating advisory and industry research.”
Indeed, the IKB slide deck goes on, bragging in the kind of detail you can bet Goldman Sachs’ attorneys will be happy to share about the “excellent rating IKB enjoys” thanks to its “outstanding funding base”; the “Strong and stable customer relations based on relationship banking over decades”; the “High diversity of IKB loan book”; the “High granularity” of the IKB loan portfolio; the “Improving quality of the loan book” and the bank’s “Solid capital base for business growth.”

So confident was IKB’s management of all these things that Slide 35 boasts that “IKB is going to meet the operating profit target for the financial year 2006/2007 as a whole.”

How, exactly, would IKB perform this feat?

Slide 36 informs us that one of the ways is by the “additional investments in international loan portfolios.”

International loan portfolios such as ABACUS 2007-AC1, perhaps?

There is more—60 pages in all—but from our brief review it would appear that this particular German bank took the other side of the Paulson trade not because it didn’t know Paulson was selling.

After all, at the time the deal was structured in early 2007, John Paulson was just “John Paulson, merger arbitrage hedge fund guy,”not “John Paulson, billionaire hedge fund manager who bet against the housing bubble and won.”

No, it would appear that IKB—creator of BACCHUS, self-proclaimed possessor of “high expertise in all fields of corporate finance,” and seeker of “additional investments in international loan portfolios”—simply wanted the other side of ABACUS, period.

From BACCHUS to ABACUS really wasn’t too long a journey for IKB, but it was deadly.
And while Goldman & Company may have showed IKB the way, they did not, it would seem, drag them kicking and screaming.
More like skipping and singing.
Jaded we may be, but we here at NotMakingThisUp will bet, as the saying goes, dollars to donuts that at the end of the day, the score in this case looks like this:

Goldman 1, SEC 0.

Jeff Matthews
I Am Not Making This Up
© 2010 NotMakingThisUp, LLC

The content contained in this blog represents only the opinions of Mr. Matthews, who also acts as an advisor: clients advised by Mr. Matthews may hold either long or short positions in securities of various companies discussed in the blog based upon Mr. Matthews’ recommendations. This commentary in no way constitutes investment advice, and should never be relied on in making an investment decision, ever. Also, this blog is not a solicitation of business: all inquiries will be ignored. The content herein is intended solely for the entertainment of the reader, and the author.

Categories
Uncategorized

Finally: Pulling Back the Curtain at Sears Holdings

 Almost since the inception of this virtual column, we’ve poked a lot of fun at Sears Holdingseven during the good times, when “SHLD” was a high-flying stock
thanks to the notion that investors should forget the stores were a mess and the customer base was a dying demographic, because the real estate
beneath those stores was of inestimable value—value that would somehow,
someway, be realized by the mastermind of the whole thing, Eddie Lampert, who had famously created scads of shareholder value for others and himself with AutoZone.

 You can read why it was clear that Sears was no AutoZone, here, here and
especially here.  (Just for fun, read some of the
comments appended to each of those columns…it will refresh your memory as to the kind of dreams anxious shareholders kept clinging to, because they didn’t appreciate anyone raining on their parade
one bit.)
 In any case, finally, somebody has gone behind
the curtain at Sears Holdings and revealed what was behind that curtain all
along.  
 That somebody who went behind the curtain is Mina Kimes of
Bloomberg, and the resulting story is so well done, and so compelling, you ought to stop
reading this and starting reading that, which you can do here.
 As they say, enough said.
Jeff Matthews
Author “Warren Buffett’s Successor: Who It Is And Why It Matters”
(eBooks on Investing, 2013)    $2.99
Kindle Version at Amazon.com
© 2013
NotMakingThisUp, LLC              
The
content contained in this blog represents only the opinions of Mr.
Matthews.   Mr. Matthews also acts as an
advisor and clients advised by Mr. Matthews may hold either long or short
positions in securities of various companies discussed in the blog based upon
Mr. Matthews’ recommendations.  This
commentary in no way constitutes investment advice, and should never be relied
on in making an investment decision, ever. 
Also, this blog is not a solicitation of business by Mr. Matthews: all
inquiries will be ignored.  And if you
think Mr. Matthews is kidding about that, he is not.  The content herein is intended solely for the
entertainment of the reader, and the author.

Categories
Uncategorized

Of Jon Corzine, Holman Jenkins, Jr., J.J. Gittes and King Lear

 Holman Jenkins, Jr. has written yet another
column in the Wall Street Journal’s op-ed pages concerning the fate of Jon
Corzine, the ex-Goldman banker who, as governor, was at the driver’s wheel when
New Jersey hit the metaphorical wall, and, not long afterward, as CEO, was in
the same position when MF Global filed Chapter 11.
  In our business, you connect those kinds of
dots.
 Anyway, Jenkins’ previous Corzine-related piece lambasted
the Fed’s apparently insatiable desire to go after Corzine, declaring, “it is
not yet a crime to lose money, even lots of it” and summing up his take on the
Corzine affair thusly:
 It is perhaps time for the rest of us to accept
that Mr. Corzine simply made a lousy CEO for a lousy, obsolescing, dial-up
commodity brokerage. He was a one-trick pony who played his one trick, trying
to trade MF back to short-term prosperity while he reshaped the firm.
 In today’s piece, Jenkins appears to back off that
assessment, apparently, but it’s hard to say: he starts off with a sentence
that is mystifying at first glance, almost a haiku, except that the more you think about it the
less you understand what he’s getting
at:
 If
something happens, it is a truism that Jon Corzine didn’t prevent it. Alas,
that is as true of World War II and the invention of the wine press as it is of
MF Global’s misuse of customer money.
 The body of the piece, which is titled
“Corzine’s ‘Chinatown’,” does not explain this haiku any more than it mentions
the Chinatown thing again, so readers are left to wonder if Jenkins means a)
the Jack Nicholson movie about “a private detective (J.J. Gittes)…caught up in
a web of deceit, corruption and murder,” according to the IMDB, or b) the
section of San Francisco between Nob Hill and North Beach.
 Either way, the final paragraph does not solve
the riddle for us, because it concludes with a question that involves neither the
movie nor the place:
 One big
question may be answerable only when a complete picture of MF’s last weeks and
days is filled in. When the entire gestalt comes into focus, will it be
possible to believe that Mr. Corzine didn’t know Ms. O’Brien was misusing customer
money, even if he never authorized such misuse?
 Rather than try to interpret Mr. Jenkins’
latest salvo, let alone what gestalt has to do with it, we here at NotMakingThisUp provide, without comment, a sampler of quotes (courtesy of Bloomberg LLC) from various presentations Jon Corzine made in his
short, unhappy life as CEO of MF Global, so readers may recall how truly bad
his tenure was; how the decisions he made (and took responsibility for) regarding European sovereign bonds helped doom the
thing; and how, in the hands of somebody else, MF Global may well have
continued on its way as merely a “lousy, obsolescing, dial-up commodity
brokerage,” in the words of Holman Jenkins, Jr., rather than as yet another
cautionary tale on the uses and abuses of leverage in the thin-margin world of
finance.
 It is a tale more reminiscent of King Lear
than J.J. Gittes, in our view.
June 3, 2010
  “I came to MF Global because I thought
it was a tremendous entrepreneurial
opportunity to
build a very, very strong business. We already have a good product line. We
have a good global footprint. I think they are under utilized. And we are set
very directly entering the steps that I think will allow us to use that
platform much more successfully in the future than what has been the case in
the past.

  “In fact, I have said it and I will say
it again. Our performance in the last
three
years in the public market is unacceptable, and we are going to take those
steps immediately and over the long-term to put ourselves into shareholder
return profile that is sensible, and I think competitive with
best-in-class in our area…
 “And
regulatory reform plays into the strength of many of those that will be
here today, but certainly to MF obviously centrally
traded derivatives, which have large growth rates of opportunities in the
future. And we have the skills and the core capacity and competency to operate
in are very much going
to be a
centerpiece of the regulatory reform, not just in the United States, but across
the globe.

  “And I also say there is another element,
which ties to something that will
say
about our business plan. There will be a de-leveraging of so-called bulge
bracket firms. I don’t think there will be any less demand for risk management
practices among investing clients across the globe. Somebody is
going to fill that space. We intend to be one that
moves solidly into providing those risk managing skills and access points as we
go forward…
 “And I think not only do we need to
strengthen capital by the steps that we
are taking
whether it is the follow-on offering, the exchange offering, but it also has to
be followed by what I talked about just previously. We need to get into a
position of sustained earnings and building capital internally…
 I want to stress risk management, because my predecessor did a
good job of
addressing
historical reserve problems, but I think we have to implement the human element
of risk management on top of the systems that have been put in place. This is
something that I’ve worked on most of my life. And I think that we can bring
both [sic] the operations, the system, the technology to managing
risk, but we need to have the right people to take
that risk and manage it day-to-day.

  “So, and I would then second lastly say
that we have a strong management team,
stronger
than I think a lot of people appreciate…”
Jon
S. Corzine, CEO and Chairman, MF Global, Sandler O’Neill Exchange &
Brokerage Conference, June 3, 2010 [Courtesy of Bloomberg]

June 9, 2011
 “Thank
you, everybody. Good to be back, Rich. It is actually 14 months and nine days
since I started at MF Global, and loving every minute of it…
 And,
quite simply, volatility is the friend of those of us who are in the risk
intermediation business for clients…. Volumes are down because people are a
little more risk-averse. But we think on balance, the things that are positive
in the environment are good for us to build our business.

  “And so we’re aggressively transforming
what MF Global is. Rich spoke about
it,
written about it. We’ve spoken in each of our quarterly calls about it.

  “We’re focused on three sort of main
objectives, themes of this. First of all,
creating
a diversified business with multiple sustainable sources of growth
for profitability, and so that we can be profitable in
all kinds of environments, not just one where you have a sharply upward sloping
yield
curve in short-term rates in America,
or depending on volumes on exchanges.

  “We want capacity to be successful across
different market environments. We’ve expanded the number of products, the
placements, and the structure of how we deliver products and services to our
clients, and we’re integrating how we talk to clients, as opposed to one
product at a time. That is
expanding our
client base, which is an important ingredient. That’s a theme that we’re
working on day in and day out, lots of detail to that.

  “We’re constructing a more flexible cost
structure. I was the inheritor of a
very
fixed cost structure. Actually it wasn’t fixed; it was variable. Your revenues
went up, your cost structure automatically went up in proportion. We have
worked, both by individual negotiation with people inside the firm and
with heavy turnover of personnel, a great deal of
flexibility in our compensation system. There will be even more, and it will
show up in our numbers, so that we’re not just dependent on growth in revenues.

  “These are the three broad strategic
things I’ll talk about, what we’re trying to as a business strategically. But
if you build those and we implement them
well,
we think there is – I feel very confident that this is a business with
that differentiation of diversified business, expanded
number of products,
and a flexible cost
structure, that we will be in a position to deliver
double-digit returns across the business cycle for our
shareholders.

  “I want to make a caveat that I’ve said
at every quarterly call and I think I
said
here a year ago. I think it takes four to six quarters to get restructured,
been here four quarters, a month, and nine days. We do not
expect substantial adjustments, but there are things
we can do. We still have
some more work,
for instance, in restructuring our capital structure. You have seen some of
that work. It shows up in the GAAP gains. But we have an absolute commitment to
deliver GAAP earnings in the second half of our fiscal year, which happens to
be the December quarter and March quarter of this
year.
  “On all of these fundamental elements
that I’ve been talking about, I think we have made real progress, and I’m
confident that we’re on track to make sure that we deliver what we’re talking
about. And I think what we had said we were going to do, we have actually been
very, very strongly supported by the facts of how we’re doing, and I’ll go over
that in a second…
 “And
finally, I’ll just talk a little bit about the potential benefits of financial
reform. I think most people sit and figure out – or think that they’re all bad,
but for someone like MF Global that has exchange-traded and clearing
experience, is co-located very well at most of the major exchanges -better than
very well at most of the exchanges across the globe, we think we can provide
DMA services for our clients very effectively. We think there is an
understanding of the rules of the major exchanges and how you work with the
governance procedures, how you work with the CFTC versus other places.

 “The general experience we think is very
positive for us….
 “And, as
you heard, there will be an adjustment process that allows for firms to make
the decisions, and I think there will be lots of opportunity no matter how that
cuts. And so we worry a little bit less about it than some of the other folks.
I’m more worried about making sure that the systemic risk doesn’t sweep all
institutions into a vortex of trouble at the same time, and in general, I’m a
believer that the evolving regulatory structure will be good…”
 From Question & Answer Session:
 Q – Richard H. Repetto: Okay. Questions?
Jon, as we get into – it seems
like we’ve taken a little –
another dip here in the economy, you know? Can’t blame MF Global for that, but
as we go into this what potentially – who knows what we’re looking at here. Does
that concern you? Because you’re also in a transformation. We’re four quarters
into an eight-quarter turnaround plan. Do
we
have the safeguards built in that push it back? Are there any silver linings in
some of this if we go into a softer period?

  A – Jon S. Corzine: Well, I’d much prefer
an expansionary economy in the 
United States. But one of the nice things
about being MF Global is we are global, and there are things going on outside
the United States that we have access at. That is an essential diversification
element that allows, I think, us to work through tougher environments. If you
had a global slowdown of very
substantial
proportions, it would be troubling.…
  Q –
Richard H. Repetto: We are a tad out of time, but I would cross the
tape that you purchased stock today. So, number one, I
guess you’re a believer in MF Global…

  A – Jon S. Corzine: I instructed some
people to buy stock today, yes.
Jon
S. Corzine, CEO and Chairman, MF Global, Sandler O’Neill Exchange &
Brokerage Conference, June 9, 2011 [Courtesy of Bloomberg]

September 12, 2011
 “Put it simply, preserving capital and
managing uncertainty has to be the first order of the day in the world that we
live in today, to do otherwise is a major mistake. Without question, this is
one of the most demanding times, stress filled marketplaces, I’ve seen or
experienced in the 30-some odd years that I’ve been in the business. As most of
you know, I was working on State Street in Trenton in 2008, so I didn’t
experience the depth of the heat of the fire and some of the stresses directly,
but main street, straight street in the global marketplace are still feeling
the aftershocks of a lot of the elements of 2008, and it’s psychology is
totally intertwined with today’s marketplace. And the hangover has been
aggravated pretty seriously by the complications and the uncertainty that
accompanies the evolution of the regulatory regime that we all work with….

 “I think
you know that you have seven debt downgrades, debt ceilings, euro sovereigns,
all that kind of thing, are every day fare in papers and on the newswires.

  “To say the least these are not normal
times, and in fact, I don’t even think they’re new normal. In more certain
periods, at other times, we were calling some of the instability and the volatility
of friends who were trading-focus firm, but anyone that thinks hyper volatility
is important to success, I think, is probably overstating and gilding it
really.

  “We think assessing risk, husbanding
liquidity and capital, the current
environment
is an imperative, and while we stay on the strategic direction, which I’ll
speak about in the future, we want to make sure that we’re doing everything
that we can in the short run to make sure that our capital’s preserved and our
relationships and ability to serve our clients is utmost.

  “In this context, we have been working
assiduously to build our capacities in both capital and liquidity standard
historically high levels for the firm, $2.6 billion in capital and $3.7 billion
in liquidity, both buttress [sic], I
think,
many of you may know, by two longer-term debt issues, one a convertible one, a
subordinated debt done in early August of $650 million.

  “But equally important, we are
continually assessing risk and adjusted returns on all significant positions in
conjunction with risk and stress management, in both our trading and liquidity
positions. And in fact, I have to say; at this point in time this is the
central focus of my day-to-day job…
 “We are
seeing an enormous growth in the
number of people who are signing
up as clients, relationships that we’re establishing, 50% quarter-over-quarter
and year-to-date. This is a long run, real advantage for our firm, and we’re
doing business with about half of these folks today. The environment allows us
also to deepen our relationships, if you’re consistent in how you service
clients, with existing folks, and we really think this is a business-building
opportunity to be
consistent in markets
as we go forward….
 “This is
a good teaching moment for those who joined into an organization as we reset
our strategy, and we feel good about it.

  “So make no mistake, this is not a time
to retreat from building our firm, but it is one where we must be always,
always damped in disciplined. We look at this, circumstances of the current
market environment, as good for the long term, challenging in the short term.
We think it’ll make us stronger, and more productive over a long period of
time, very positive implications for our long-term results….
 And while we have built up our trading positions, we take a high
turnover,
relatively low VAR, attitude
about how we approach markets. And if you look at our quarterly reports, you
will see that our VAR has stayed fairly
consistent
throughout this period, even though we are broadening out our participation in
all of these markets….
 “So
that’s our story. We think we’re sort of in the fourth or fifth inning of
this rebuild. We think a lot of the transitioning is
behind us. That doesn’t mean there isn’t a lot of building and team building
and effort that goes to make sure that what we’ve put in place is as productive
as it should be.

  “There will be some adjustments; you
don’t make every choice of 800 people
perfectly.
Some things will have to be adjusted. Some things that we have made more
commitment to, rather than less, we may judge needs to be adjusted from time to
time, and we’re prepared to make those decisions, be tough.
 “But as
I said, at the beginning of the presentation, at the end of the day, right
now, as we go through this very challenging time
addressing liquidity and capital and preservation thereof, is our number one
priority. We think it’ll come through this, and we think we’ll come out
stronger and better for it over time….”
  
Jon S. Corzine, CEO and Chairman, MF
Global, September 12, 2011 Barclays Global Financial Services Conference.
[Courtesy of Bloomberg]

October 25, 2011
 “Thank
you, Jeremy and thank you all for joining on our second quarter call.

This morning Henri and I will first update you
on our financial results as summarized in slide three in our packet, and then
we’ll post you on the implementation of our strategic plan, the status of our
European sovereign exposure, and finally, I’ll offer a perspective on the path
forward.

 “Let me begin by acknowledging that our
September’s quarter’s results and
actions
were defined by the well reported stress conditions experienced by global
markets. Those conditions of hyper volatility brought on in part by sovereign
risk, including for the U.S. bank capitalization concerns and non-standard
central bank actions undoubtedly slowed the translation of our strategic
progress into financial performance. Without question, quarter’s market
environment was as difficult as any of that I’ve experienced in my 30-plus
years in finance. Accordingly, we on balance reduced our principal exposures in
our proprietary and client facilitation books, which in turn resulted in
limited principal transaction revenues, but it also avoided any major trading
losses….
  “Now let me turn to a subject which has
understandably clouded perceptions

with respect to our profits, that is our
repurchase to maturity sovereign positions as noted on slide five. As we have
pointed out over the past year in our disclosures and quarterly calls, we have
taken advantage of the dislocations in the European sovereign debt market by
buying short dated debt in European peripherals and financing those securities
to their exact maturity date. Therefore, the term repoed to maturity.

  “The spread between interest earned and the
financing cost of the underlying

repurchase agreement has often been attractive
even as the structure of the transaction themselves essentially eliminates
market and financing risk. At the inception of these positions, we made the
judgment that the securities we financed to maturity would repay, given their
high credit rating and short duration – that is all securities mature before
12/31/2012 – and later
reinforced by the
commitments of European and international institutions in supporting the
solvency of the issuing countries.
 “Again,
in the timeframe of our exposures, the full RTM portfolio we hold is seen on
slide five. We specifically tiered the maturity of our holdings to reflect
credit ratings at

the time of inception, and reassessed our risk
based on the EFSF and IMF support programs, that significantly enhanced the
probability and the ability of Portugal and Ireland to meet their obligations
on schedule, again, within the context of their maturities, in Ireland and
Portugal’s case, June 2012….

 “Again, in the maturity timeframe of our holdings, 12/31/2012, we
expect any of the actions proposed to give additional support to an already
strong probability and
ability of these
nations to meet their obligations.

 “So, in short, our judgment is that our
positions have relatively little
underlying
principle risk in the timeframe of our exposure. We continually reassess that
judgment and are prepared to take offsetting actions if conditions or
circumstances change. We are not adding to this portfolio and we will allow it
to roll off as the staggered maturities are reached. I would also note that we
carry little exposure to these countries’ banking systems and no derivative
exposures dependent on a country’s credit worthiness.

 “In addition, consistent with prior
quarters, there is no mark-to-market
associated
with the derivative value of these positions.
 “On a
personal note,
our positions and the judgment
about risk mediation steps are my personal responsibility and a prime focus of
my attention….
 “As we move forward, we’ll also
continuously look to manage our cost to the
lowest
possible level. We will redouble our efforts to bring compensation and
non-compensation costs in line with our previously stated objectives, including
by further reduction in head count and stringent expensive controls.

  “Let me close by noting that while we
recognize and respect the challenges of
the
environment, we also believe that is one with opportunity – filled with
opportunity. As I have noted previously on this stressful time, we have
husbanded our capital and strengthened our liquidity, but we’ve also added
outstanding producers and feel we have opportunity to do more of the same in
the near-term. With a modicum of market normalcy, I believe we’ll deliver for
our shareholders in the quarters ahead. With that, I’ll turn it over to Henri
for the numbers….”
From Question & Answer
Session:
  Q – Richard H. Repetto: “I guess, Jon,
my question is on the principal
trading, I understood, you’re
pulling back and preserving capital. I’m just trying to see, one, is there any
– can you foresee any sustainable impact, like as you pull back client
facilitation, could it be an issue with you not being there in the volatile
period as well?”

  A – Jon S. Corzine: “Listen, Rich, I
think that as I stated in my remarks,
the
third quarter, calendar quarter, our second quarter was probably the most
volatile period I’ve ever experienced in the sort of 30 years of activity in
markets….
 “I think
we will be back on
track in the way that we bad been
building over the previous four quarter until we got to the hyper volatility
that we saw particularly in August and September.”…
  “We’ve done a lot of work to put
ourselves into a much more stable position
with lower a
cost of capital than what we had 18 months ago. We will continue to be
opportunistic in that manner, but the primary means for us going forward is as
I outlined: to capitalize on some of the valuable non-core assets that we think
we can monetize and look to capturing the value in some of the things that we
talked about in other calls, the insurance settlement and other things that
will drop directly to the bottom line and building up
our capital.
  “And the second observation is we were
very cautious at the end of the quarter
with
regard to the draw. Felt to us like September 30 was more or like a
yearend period in time, and so it seemed perfectly
logical for us to make sure that we had all of the potential liquidity that we
might need over that period of time and we repaid it very quickly. That’s what
the facility is for. We intend to use it in that context going forward. But, we
are in a much, much stronger liquidity position as Henri outlined.”
  
Jon S. Corzine, CEO and Chairman, MF
Global, October 25, 2011earnings call. [Courtesy of Bloomberg]

 For the record, MF Global filed for Chapter 11
bankruptcy on October 31, 2011.
Jeff Matthews
Author “Warren Buffett’s Successor: Who It Is And Why It Matters”
(eBooks on Investing, 2013)    $2.99
Kindle Version at Amazon.com
© 2013
NotMakingThisUp, LLC              
The
content contained in this blog represents only the opinions of Mr.
Matthews.   Mr. Matthews also acts as an
advisor and clients advised by Mr. Matthews may hold either long or short
positions in securities of various companies discussed in the blog based upon
Mr. Matthews’ recommendations.  This
commentary in no way constitutes investment advice, and should never be relied
on in making an investment decision, ever. 
Also, this blog is not a solicitation of business by Mr. Matthews: all
inquiries will be ignored.  And if you
think Mr. Matthews is kidding about that, he is not.  The content herein is intended solely for the
entertainment of the reader, and the author.
Categories
Uncategorized

DealBook Question Already Answered on Amazon.com

 Another day, another “Is Warren Buffett is Irreplaceable?” article. 
 Today’s version, however, carries the imprimatur of the New
York Times’ “DealBook” column, and it’s written by a professor to boot. 
 The gist
of the professor
’s case appears right in the first two paragraphs, as follows:
 Acquisitions usually come with a nice premium
for the seller. But when Warren E. Buffett is the buyer, there is typically
something of a discount.
 The ability to make acquisitions on favorable
terms is a testament to Mr. Buffett’s personality and skills as a deal maker.
It also highlights an almost unsolvable problem for his company, Berkshire Hathaway, and its
shareholders. When its 82-year-old chief executive is gone, who will negotiate
such sweet deals?
 Exhibit A in the ensuing story is the recent Heinz deal,
terms of which the professor parses in order to make the point that Buffett got
a “really tasty” deal when considering the expense of the 9% preferred stock
issued to Berkshire relative to the 4.25% yield on debt issued to help fund the
balance of the acquisition:
  Mr.
Buffett is getting 55 percent of Heinz plus an interest payment of $700 million
a year. This is an extraordinarily good deal.
 Furthermore, the professor points out, the fact that “The
Heinz board decided to deal only with Berkshire” fits the pattern established during the Burlington Northern and Lubrizol deals, where “neither board appeared to negotiate
particularly hard.”
 Thus, he concludes, “When it
comes to Mr. Buffett, boards roll over.”
 The analysis, however, leaves aside a few important facts.
 Fact one is that Berkshire (and its partner in the Heinz deal, 3G)
is paying an all-time high price for Heinz stock since it was founded in 1869.
 Fact two is that no strategic buyer expressed any interest at all in outbidding Berkshire and 3G for Heinz.
 And the reason nobody else stepped in is that Berkshire and 3G are paying an extremely
high multiple for Heinz—14.3-times EBITDA (a metric Buffett distrusts) and
17.4X pre-tax, pre-interest income, his preferred valuation measure. 
 In fact, Buffett said at the recent
shareholder meeting, “Charlie and I paid probably a little more than we would
have if we’d bought it ourselves,” without 3G, who will run it.
 So the Heinz deal is hardly a steal—and if it
were, surely any number of strategic buyers or Carl Icahn-types would have jumped into the fray to push up the price.  (Witness the current bidding war for Sprint, which has an enterprise value of $39 billion, compared to Heinz at $27 billion.)
 As for the Burlington and Lubrizol boards
“rolling over” for Buffett during their negotiations, well, again, the facts disagree with the superficial observation: 
Berkshire paid a record all-time high
price for Lubrizol (specifically,
 $135 a share for a stock
that had traded at $23.75 less than 24 months prior to the deal announcement).
 And in the case of Burlington Northern Santa Fe, a Class 1 railroad with almost no alternative bidder who could even theoretically buy the company, Buffett paid $100 a share for a
stock that had traded above $100 a share for less than five months out of its
160 year history (during the housing bubble, just prior to the financial crisis).  J
ust seven months before Berkshire’s bid the
stock had touched $50.73 a share, and the day prior to the announcement it was
$75.87
 Oh, and Berkshire offered either cash or stock
for Burlington’s shares, so whatever the Burlington board was theoretically
leaving on the table by not soliciting somebody else—and who else could have  topped Berkshire’s $35 billion bid in those dark days is a topic the
professor does not address—will accrue to those Burlington shareholders who
took Berkshire stock instead of cold, hard cash.
 There is one other major factor outside price and availability of other suitors that explains the ability of Buffett to court companies, and it is a big one not discussed in the DealBook article: Berkshire does not mess with the companies it buys.
 Unlike most acquirers, who promise their Wall Street investors zillions of dollars in synergies (i.e. layoffs and plant closures) resulting in all manner of earnings accretion, Buffett leaves his companies alone, and that is a tangible benefit which any board of directors ought to consider when deciding what should happen to the assets for which they are a fiduciary.
 In the case of Burlington Northern, for example, the ability to invest for growth, without the need to meet Wall Street forecasts, as part of Berkshire Hathaway has allowed the railroad to take advantage of a shale oil boom that has helped boost revenues by 40% and pre-tax earnings by 50% since the day the deal closed.
 And that is good for not just the Burlington Northern railroad, and for Berkshire Hathaway, and for Warren Buffett…it is good for the Burlington Northern shareholders who chose to take Berkshire stock, a key point missing from the DealBook analysis.
 As for the question asked by DealBook, “When its 82-year-old chief executive is gone, who will negotiate such sweet deals?” the answer is:
 a) there’s a
guy; 
 b) he’s already getting the same kinds of deals Warren Buffett is getting, and;
Jeff Matthews
Author “Warren Buffett’s Successor: Who It Is and Why It Matters”
(eBooks on Investing, 2013)   
Available now at Amazon.com
© 2013
NotMakingThisUp, LLC
                                   
The
content contained in this blog represents only the opinions of Mr.
Matthews.   Mr. Matthews also acts as an
advisor and clients advised by Mr. Matthews may hold either long or short
positions in securities of various companies discussed in the blog based upon
Mr. Matthews’ recommendations.  This
commentary in no way constitutes investment advice, and should never be relied
on in making an investment decision, ever. 
Also, this blog is not a solicitation of business by Mr. Matthews: all
inquiries will be ignored.  And if you
think Mr. Matthews is kidding about that, he is not.  The content herein is intended solely for the
entertainment of the reader, and the author.
Categories
Uncategorized

“We Want to Win”: The Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting, 2013 Edition

 Well
props to ‘CD 105.9’
is all I can think, driving east on Dodge Street in a
cold rain to the Berkshire Hathaway shareholder meeting early on a dark Saturday morning.
 
 The reason for my good mood?  The Omaha “classic rock” station I’ve had my
rental car radio set to the last three days is playing “Back in the USSR,” making
this the first time I’ll have been to a Berkshire meeting with Paul McCartney’s
Beatles-era send-up of communist Russia ringing in my ears.
 “Let me hear your balalaikas ringing out/come
and keep your Comrade warm/I’m back in the USSR/You don’t know how lucky you
are, boy/Back in the USSR.”
 What better way to get ready for Warren Buffett’s “Woodstock for Capitalists” than that?
 Unfortunately, while CD 105.9 manages to mix
more Beatles into its playlist than most “classic rock” formats do (they played
“With a Little Help From My Friends” twice in two days)—something I’ve never
quite understood, since The Beatles’ catalogue is about as “classic” as it gets—the
good vibes never last long because the station also plays an inexplicably heavy
rotation of Bob Seger.
 Pondering this oddly heteromorphic play list as the final
A chord on “USSR” fades out, I focus on my driving, because there’s still snow on
the ground here in Omaha—unusual at this time of year, when the fields should
be springing to life—and the roads are slick with rain, which is why they’ve
already opened up the CenturyLink arena to Berkshire shareholders and Buffett groupies instead
of forcing them to wait outside until the normal 7 a.m. doors-open time,
according to a text message from a waiting acquaintance who’s already nabbed a
seat inside and is saving one for me.
Disoriented in Downtown Omaha
 But it’s not just the early morning darkness
and wet roads causing me to pay more attention than usual.
 Omaha’s had a growth spurt since last year’s
meeting, a fact I’d discovered last night
trying to find the
Hilton, which is right next door to the CenturyLink, and both the hotel and the arena used to stand out like the
Empire State Building (in its heyday) above an otherwise barren strip of vacant
lots and highway exit ramps just a few blocks from downtown Omaha.
 But
most of those lots have given way to multi-story parking garages, hi-tech warehouses,
bustling industrial buildings and even a baseball stadium (Omaha hosts the college
world series every summer), causing me to lose my bearings more than once last
night and prompting me to pay attention this morning.
 (It’s
not just the business district that’s growing: the Old Market area—Omaha’s Soho,
if you will—is changing, too.  What used
to be not much more than a square city block of jarring cobblestone streets and
red bricked restaurants, bars and the occasional shop has spread into
neighboring streets, with new restaurants everywhere and even a near-high-rise
condo building going up along its fringe.)
 I park on a side street in a metered spot a
few blocks from the CenturyLink—the parking meters aren’t used on
Saturdays (a little trick to save the $8 they now charge for event parking…I
could swear it was $5 last year)—and head to the show while admiring the new
buildings, which seem to be everywhere. 
 It’s almost Miami-esque, at least in terms of quantity
if not in bling.  After all, the Midwest
doesn’t do bling.
Not Exactly ‘Hard Time
Mississippi’
 It does do volatile weather, of course, and
the cold rain has eliminated the usual long lines of eager shareholders waiting
for the doors to open, pushing everyone inside to find a seat and then get
coffee before the movie starts.
 I find my seat and settle down while absorbing the
scene inside the arena, where 19,000 other people are finding their seats while Stevie
Wonder’s gritty “Living For the City” plays on the sound system—painting
quite a verbal contrast with the very rich, urbane crowd gathering here: “A boy
is born/in hard time Mississippi/surrounded by four walls that ain’t so
pretty/his parents give him love and affection/to keep him strong, moving in
the right direction/Living just enough, just enough for the city…”
 Paul Simon’s “The Boy In the Bubble” comes on
next, its terrific beat marred by reference to “the bomb in the baby carriage,” which is a little too close
to the recent events in Boston for comfort, so I head out to try to find Mario
Gabelli, who usually works the floor for investment ideas from locals he has
been grilling for decades, as only Mario can, and immediately bump into Doug
Kass and his son Noah.
 Doug is the
short-seller Buffett has chosen to be on the panel of three analysts asking
questions (in conjunction with another panel of three reporters asking
questions, with shareholders making up the rest), and we hug despite him
carrying a bulging briefcase and a clutch of papers.

 Dougie is prepared, as well he
should be, but that’s no surprise to me. 
We go way back to the early days of TheStreet.com, where the strictures of a for-profit enterprise eventually led me
to start this not-for-profit blog, and I’ve always admired his willingness to
say what he means and mean what he says without the need for crowd approval—a
trait that will come in handy today.
Daniel in the Lion’s Den
 It is, of course, a very good year for Buffett to include a
short-seller on his panel, because so very little has gone wrong for Berkshire lately.
 No health scare flare-ups have occurred for
Buffett (at least, publicly), and none of his CEOs have flamed out in the
spectacular fashion of David Sokol two years back, although Buffett did fire the CEO
of Benjamin Moore rather abruptly last summer, prompting speculation it was for
behavior unbecoming a CEO (according to the New York Post it was a flamboyant
boat trip that was the last straw, which Buffett later denied). 
 Furthermore, business at Berkshire is smoking,
as the earnings release last night showed. 
Berkshire is, at its heart, an American company—with one big railroad,
several energy utilities and multiple manufacturing companies driving the
numbers, while insurance provides the cash for Buffett to spend as he thinks
rational.  And since most of those operations are largely in the US, and since the US is doing far better than Europe at the moment, and since much of our economic improvement is related to the housing
business, where Berkshire has a big footprint, the numbers were really good.
 On top of all that, the derivatives bets
Buffett made several years ago (essentially selling insurance against a market
decline) have recovered along with the Europe bourses, reversing bookkeeping
losses that piled up during the take-your-pick-which-southern-European-country’s-meltdown-will-hit-the-front-page-today
period one or two years ago.
 Oh, and he just bought Heinz in partnership
with an investor group he admires, which should be a good long-term deal for
Berkshire, and yet he still has $49
billion of cash to invest.
 All in all, Dougie could not have picked a tougher
year to accept Buffett’s challenge to play the skeptic in front of 19,000
people in one arena—19,000 people who pretty much worship, or at least admire,
if not adore, Warren Buffett.
 But accept it he did, and he seems remarkably
calm but fired up.  He proudly introduces
me to his son, I wish him luck and move on, but never manage to find Mario
before the movie begins at 8:30 on the dot.
Breaking Funny
 The movie is almost all new, and almost all
the same. 
 There’s a cartoon and plenty of Berkshire-company
ads, including one laugh-out-loud GEICO commercial; a Jon Stewart love-fest
video clip; and the always-included Salomon Brothers testimony by which Buffett
reinforces the Berkshire culture for every manager in room: “Lose money and I
will be understanding; lose one shred of our reputation and I will be
ruthless.” 
 There’s a terrific video bit (a very funny
“Breaking Bad” takeoff in which Brian Cranston and his partner-in-crime are
using their desert lab to make peanut brittle, and Buffett wants to buy him out
before it damages See’s Candies) and the whole thing concludes with the usual
celebration of Berkshire’s managers, only the tune is no longer “My Favorite
Things,” it’s “YMCA.”
 “We love the managers of B-R-K-A” is the
chorus, with lyrics that name all the usual suspects in Berkshire’s management
pantheon.  Soon ballroom lights start
dancing around the arena and then in come cheerleaders (University of Nebraska,
natch), waving pompons and signs with the Berkshire stock ticker letters.
 The crowd follows their lead, gets to its feet
and is soon doing the “YMCA” moves….
 Poor Doug Kass.
 Buffett Steals a Railroad
 Buffett starts off the Q&A, as he always
does, reviewing the just-reported earnings, but without the usual management
blather about “beating the analyst consensus” or “executing our key
strategies,” or, most nauseatingly, “driving value for our shareholders.”
 Instead he sums things up quite simply: “It
was a benign quarter in insurance, and our other business did quite well.”  He notes with modesty that, “fortunately, a
lot of oil has been found very close to our railroad tracks,” so the Burlington
Northern railroad is moving a lot oil—more than half a million barrels a day, which
is staggering considering that amounts to 10% of all the oil produced in the United
States. It’s also pumped up the profits of the BNSF like nobody’s business: car
loadings in the quarter were up the most of the four Class 1 railroads. 
 In hindsight, Buffett stole the BNSF.  He doesn’t say that out loud, of course.  But he really did steal it.
 This is the math: Berkshire paid 3-times revenue, 8.75-times “EBITDA”
(which Buffett dismisses as a number subject to manipulation—a bit
disconcerting since every company in America waves a highly subjective,
non-GAAP “EBITDA” number in front of Wall Street’s analysts, like a shiny
object in front of a dog) and 12.5-times his preferred number: pre-taxes and
pre-interest income. 
 But BNSF’s revenue has grown nearly 40% since the deal closed and pre-tax
income has risen 50%. 
 Thus, on 2012 earnings, Berkshire paid only
7.25-times pre-tax, pre-interest earnings for the Burlington Northern and Sante
Fe Railroad.  Union Pacific,
Burlington’s sole competitor in the western states, on the other hand, today trades at 9-times, and that is without any acquisition premium.
 So he really did steal it—for $45 billion.
The Fifth Most Valuable Company
 Buffett finishes the preliminaries with a
slide showing the five largest market-cap companies, which today includes BRK/A. 
 “We’re now the fifth most valuable company in
the world,” he says, drawing applause from the crowd, but, again, he doesn’t
play the CEO game where the CEO gripes about the stock price and how Wall
Street analysts misunderstand how great the company is: he simply says, “That
can change over time, but I hope it changes for the better.”
 (He also makes an interesting remark about the
US Dollar: “We have so many different operations…I’ve never been able to figure
out [how moves in the dollar affect Berkshire].
 
And that’s very interesting, because Warren Buffett hasn’t been able to
figure it out, and you can bet he’s tried to. 
Also, if he can’t figure it out, nobody else will be able to figure it
out.)

Better Questions, Better Answers
 Now the questions begin, and while the presence of a short-seller on
the panel has generated most of the excitement in the press leading up to the
meeting, it is the presence of another analyst, Jonathan Brandt, that makes it
interesting almost immediately, for Brandt asks sharp questions about
individual businesses ranging from ISCAR to Benjamin Moore to Fruit of the
Loom—questions that have never been asked here before. 
 So, for the first time since Berkshire became a
conglomerate and the shareholder meetings turned into a kind of therapeutic
self-help mass feel-good gathering, we will really learn something about Berkshire’s
non-insurance operations.
 For example, the CEO of Benjamin Moore was
fired last summer not—as the New York Post reported—because of a lavish boat
outing: it was because “the company was investigating moves that would have
violated the promise” Buffett tells us he made to Benjamin Moore’s independent dealers when
he bought the company, i.e. that he would not move distribution into the Lowes and
Home Depots of the world.
 That’s interesting, it’s worth knowing, and
it’s the first time outside of the David Sokol affair that we really learned
something about why Buffett made a management change at one of Berkshire’s
businesses.
 And while there is much
more along those lines today, the happiest aspect of the meeting, from my point
of view, is that Charlie Munger shows no signs of slowing down.
 It Will Still Be Pleasant
Thanks to the new
Q&A system, very few of the old “What should I do with my life?” type
questions are getting asked, which means Munger has a role in answering nearly
all of them.
 For example, when asked about the prospect of Buffett’s 45-year
streak of beating the S&P 500 over every five-year period coming to an end  this year, Buffett acknowledges “it won’t be a happy day…but it comes in a
period when the market has gone up every year the last five years.” 
 Munger, however, says simply, “I don’t pay much
attention whether it’s five years or three years…we’re slowing down but it will
still be pleasant.”
Foreign Tissues Will Be
Rejected
 Buffett, for his part, is in good form
too.  Asked what worries him, Buffett
says, as you’d expect, “Preserving the culture,” while adding, “Any foreign-type
behavior would be rejected like a foreign tissue.”
 But it’s Munger who tends to answer the
question while also making the crowd laugh: “My thoughts are very simple—I want
to say to the many Mungers in the audience, ‘don’t sell these shares.’”
  When Becky Quick asks about a report that
Berkshire’s cut in the Heinz deal is better than his partners
’ share, Buffett denies it
vigorously, going into some detail on the structure.  Munger snaps,
“The report was totally wrong.”
Just Because Warren Thought
Something Doesn’t Mean It’s a Law of Nature
 Asked about his business partner’s use of
Twitter prior to the shareholder meeting (“Warren is in the house,” was the
first message), Munger says, “It’s very hard for me to know anything about
Twitter when I’m avoiding it like the plague.”
 And when Buffett is called to account for
remarks he made some years ago about corporate profits being “extraordinary”
and likely to come down—which has not yet happened—Munger shrugs it off: “Just
because Warren thought something 20 years ago doesn’t mean it’s a law of
nature.”
 Asked how Buffett’s successor will deal with
Berkshire’s highly decentralized, far-flung and informal corporate management
structure, Munger dismisses it: “If you run it as decentralized as we
do—almost to the point of abdication—what difference does it make?”
Flimflam, Magic Potions and
Pots & Pans
 The nice thing about having a short-seller,
two analysts and three reporters asking the bulk of the questions is
that the questions are well informed, broad-ranging and intelligently worded: after
all, no analyst or reporter wants to look stupid in front of 19,000 people—two
of whom happen to be the smartest investors of their generation.
 So interesting topics come up, like Bill
Ackman’s short position in multi-level-marketer Herbalife, which reporter Andrew
Ross Sorkin brings up before asking whether Ackman’s critique of that business model
calls into question Berkshire’s Pampered Chef direct-sales business.
 (Funny enough, Ackman is “in the house” here: he’s hard to miss,
being NBA-height in a very non-NBA-height crowd.)
 Buffett offers a vigorous defense, saying Pampered Chef
“is a million miles away from…this business of loading up people” with products
they can’t sell, while Munger, as usual, is more succinct: “I think there’s
likely to be more flimflam selling magic potions than pots and pans.”
 And that, as they say, is that.
I Wish We’d Done It On
Purpose
 It’s not all jokes and snappy comebacks, of
course. Asked to “give me the Peter Lynch two-minute monologue” summing up
Berkshire Hathaway’s competitive advantage, Buffett hands the question to Munger.
 “We’ve always tried to stay sane when other
people go crazy,” Munger says. “That’s a sustainable advantage.
 “Number two, we treat other companies the way
they want to be treated, and that is a competitive advantage” in making
acquisitions.
 “Number three, we’ve partnered with good
people and that is a competitive advantage.” 
Still, Munger can’t resist ending with a joke: “Those were all a very
good idea, and I wish we’d done it on purpose.”
The Fattest Rolodex in the
World
 Asked if Burlington’s rail franchise is
threatened by the decline in coal demand (one of the excellent questions by
Jonathan Brandt), and whether the crude oil-by-rail bonanza is likely to end as
pipelines get built, Buffett says, “Well, if there was no coal moving we
wouldn’t have a lot of use for some of the tracks we have…  In terms of oil, I think the view a few years
ago was there might be a blip…but I’ve talked to some crude oil producers…and I
think there will be a lot of rail usage for a long time.”  (And since Buffett has the fattest Rolodex in
the business world—literally—you can bet he’s talked to oil producers who know
what they’re talking about.)
 He also points out that “oil moves faster by
rail than pipeline,” which is quite true: oil flows through pipelines at around
2 miles an hour, on average—we’re not talking fire-hoses here.
Do You Know and Believe In
Jesus Christ?
 The significance of those two questions—and
Buffett’s answers—is they would probably not have gotten asked during the
all-shareholder Q&A format a few years ago, when high school students asked
what they should do with their lives (I’m not making that up), teachers asked
how they could draw out their shy students (not making that up, either), and,
once, a man from Norman Oklahoma asked “Do you know and believe in Jesus Christ
and do you have a personal relationship with God?” (Buffett answered that one
straight ahead, without a pause, and you can read his answer in “Secrets in Plain Sight: Business and Investing Secrets of Warren Buffett” on
Amazon Kindle.)
 But there’s another question that would never have
gotten asked, even by the reporters in the crowd—that is asked today by Doug
Kass, who makes good on Buffett’s desire to “spice things up” at the meeting.
 Before we get to that, though, an observation about today’s
proceedings is in order.
 The CenturyLink Center’s arena, where the
Q&A takes place, is packed—literally
to the rafters. 
 And while you might think that means today’s
meeting is far better attended than last year’s, which was materially less well
attended than the year before (when the David Sokol Affair prompted a whole lot
of attention on the meeting), the reason has less to do with a bigger crowd
than with less space for everyone to sit down here.
 This is something I discover during
lunch, when I go to the exhibition hall to talk to Berkshire managers (my
favorite part of the meeting, Charlie Munger’s answers aside) and realize the
exhibition hall is so full of new Berkshire company displays that it no longer
carves out satellite areas with bleachers and large screens where shareholders
can watch the proceedings outside the claustrophobic arena, which holds 19,000
in hard, uncomfortable folding seats.
 There’s a huge new Brooks running shoe display
in the back of the exhibition hall, and the recently acquired Oriental Trading Company is doing
land office business selling Warren and Charlie rubber duckies near the front
entrance (“They’re only $2, what the heck?” seems to be the reaction, given the
line).
 So while it may feel more crowded this year,
it isn’t.
 But that doesn’t mean the crowd is any less
enthusiastic than years past: after all, Berkshire’s stock is at a new all-time
high—$162,904 per share for the A shares on the close Friday.
 And considering that those same “A” shares
were trading at $16 the day Buffett took control on May 10, 1965, well, it’s no
surprise the crowd is feeling upbeat.
How Good Is Warren
Buffett’s Track Record, Really?
 But how good is Warren Buffett’s track record,
really?
 Well, Berkshire’s stock has appreciated—this
is appreciation only, no dividends, mind you—981,150% since May 10, 1965.
 And if you’d put $16 into the S&P 500
instead of into one share of Berkshire on that same day, your share of the
S&P 500 wouldn’t be worth $162,905 today from appreciation (we’re leaving
out the dividends for now.)
 In fact, your S&P 500 share wouldn’t be
worth $100,000 today.
 It wouldn’t even be worth $10,000 today.
 It would be worth about $600.
 Throw in dividends and you’re north of $1,000
but south of $2,000 on your $16 investment. 
The Berkshire shareholder has $162,904.
 That’s
how good Warren Buffet’s track record really is.
Hemming and Hawing
 Still, Buffett is human, and his response to a
question about what, exactly, IBM’s “competitive moat” may be (from a Los
Angeles-area Microsoft engineer) is not just inadequate, it’s downright
disturbing:
 “I don’t understand the moat around IBM as
well as I do around Coca Cola,” Buffett says, adding, “There’s nothing that
precludes both Microsoft that you mentioned and IBM [from doing well over time],” even though the engineer only mentioned Microsoft so Buffett knew
where he was coming from.
 IBM, for the record, is a company whose
revenues have stayed dead flat from 2008 to 2012 (at $103 billion), yet has managed to grow operating income by nearly $5 billion, thanks to a flat
expense line and rising gross margins.
 If you’re an IBM shareholder, that’s great,
because it’s clear IBM’s management team is “adding value to
shareholders.” But if you’re an IBM customer, that’s annoying, because IBM’s
management is clearly extracting value from its customers through higher prices and better-margined products.
 What with all the cloud-based alternatives to
the kind of high-cost, hard-to-get-rid-of software IBM specializes in, it’s no
wonder IBM’s sales have declined the last six months, at an accelerating pace.
 But Buffett does not get into the details,
because he doesn’t seem to know them.  He
merely says, “I think their odds are good” and then goes into a discourse on
IBM’s balance sheet that, unfortunately, does not give anyone warm and fuzzies about
Berkshire’s massive IBM investment:
 “They incidentally have a very large pension
obligation,” Buffett says.  “It is a big
annuity company on the side.  I would rather they didn
’t have that. …
The liabilities are a lot more certain than the assets over time.”
 The whole thing is disturbing, coming as it
does from a guy who can tell you how much it costs GEICO to get a new customer
($250 up front), what the net present value of that customer will be ($1,500),
how many new policies GEICO hopes to write this year (1 million) and what share
that will be of all new auto policies in the US (40%).
 But Buffett more than makes up for the IBM fumble when he
is asked another, tougher question.  “A
spicy meatball” is what a friend of mine calls these questions—and a very spicy
meatball it is when Doug Kass asks, with the utmost delicacy and respect, about
Buffett anointing his son, Howard, to take his place as Chairman of Berkshire
when Buffett is gone.
Protector of the Culture
 Doug begins by saying he means no disrespect
to Buffett by bringing up the topic in front of Buffett’s friends and
family—not to mention Howard Buffett himself. 
“My own son Noah is here with me,” Doug adds, before asking the best (and most important) question of the day: “How is Howard Buffett the most qualified person to be
chairman of Berkshire?”
 Buffett, as he always does, answers it
straight ahead.
 It is not his job to run the business or to allocate
capital or anything else,” Buffett says, stressing that Howard will be a “non-executive Chairman.”
 But “if a mistake is made in picking the
CEO,” Buffett says, “he is there as protector of the culture…. I know of nobody
that will feel more responsible for that…”
 “He has no illusions at all about running the business,” Buffett adds firmly, and
then explains the simple practicality behind the move:  
 “I have seen many times…when a mediocre CEO,
a likable guy, needs to be changed, but that’s very hard to do” because the CEO was also chairman of the board and
he “controls the agenda” and puts his own friends on the board.
  Buffett says, parenthetically, the requirement that “boards
meet once a year without the CEO is a very big improvement because the board is
a social group.” 
 “Both Charlie and I have seen where a CEO who
is 6 on a scale of 10” stays in place. 
“It could be very hard to make that change” without a chairman who cares
about the Berkshire culture.

 Munger pitches in with his usual
objective clarity: “You gotta remember the board
owns a lot of stock.  We
’re not trying to gum it up for the shareholders.”  Furthermore, “It helps to have some objective
person” chairing the board.  “I think the
Mungers will be a lot safer with Howard there.”

 That highlight over, the meeting moves quickly on…but it was a
great question, and well answered. 
Throughout, the crowd was as silent and attentive as I’ve ever heard it.
 It was worth the whole meeting.  
 And not for nothing, every CEO—and every corporate board member,
public or private—should have been here to see Doug ask the question (at any
other meeting Doug’s microphone would have been turned off so fast it would
have made his head spin), and to see both Warren and Charlie answer it,
thoughtfully and at length.
 When the topic switches to who will succeed Buffett as CEO (not as Chairman), Andrew Ross Sorkin asks if the CEO successor to Buffett isn’t Ajit Jain, and why Buffett doesn’t just say it is Ajit Jain.
 But Buffett warns him off such speculation: You started with the A’s and you won’t have any more luck when you get to the B’s,” Buffett says, shutting down the discussion here, for now.  
 (For readers who want to know who it likely is, and why it will be good for Berkshire, Warren Buffetts Successor: Who It Is and Why It Matters” eBooks on Investing, 2013, answers the question even if Buffett will not.)
  Finally, at 3:30 p.m., after five hours and 63 questions, Buffett ends the meeting to a round of applause from the remaining shareholders, who still fill two-thirds of the arena.
 I return to my car and drive back to the hotel
to write this up, “You Can’t Always Get What You Want” playing on my
now-favorite Omaha station.  
It’s a song
title I think Charlie Munger might have written.
 And speaking of Charlie Munger, a few more
Mungerisms before we go…
The Government Increased
the Proof
  On the devastating effect of Ben Bernanke’s
ultra-low interest rate policy on retirees: “Well they had to hurt somebody,
and the savers were convenient.”
  On one other side effect of the low interest
rate environment: “All over the world the life insurance companies are
suffering the tortures of hell.”
  On how young money managers can attract investors
when they have no track record: “I’m glad I’m through with that particular
problem.”
   On how the Fed created the housing bubble:
“As things got crazier and crazier, the government could have pulled away the
punch bowl—instead the government increased the proof.”
  And why nobody in the government has been
held accountable for the bubble: “You’re complaining about what’s inevitable in
life, and that’s not a good idea.”
Like Using Rat Poison as
Whipping Cream
  On why
they should never have let Greece join the EU: “It was like using rat poison as
whipping cream…they lie about their taxes…Europe made terrible mistakes, but they
have politicians like we do.”
 Why Italy is not much better than Greece:
“When the mail piles up they just throw some piles away.”
What Buffett
should do before he bargain-hunts in Europe: “Call me if it’s in Greece.”
All Problems Are Trivial
With 2% GDP Growth
 On the relationship of US debt to GDP: “I
don’t think there’s some relationship that’s written in the stars.”
 On the so-called $16 trillion debt burden:
“Most of the debt is not even included in
that number.”
 On how to fix the debt problem: “All our
problems are trivial if GDP grows 2% a year from now on out.”
Trading Agony for Money
 On forecasting the economy: “That’s not a field
where I’ve been any good.”
 On Buffett’s stock gifts to Bill Gates’
charity: “There’s nothing so insignificant as an extra $2 billion to an old
man.”
 On self-confidence: “If you think you know
more than you do you’re asking for a lot of trouble.”
 On when he and Buffett would consider splitting Berkshire stock:  “I would not hold your breath.”
 On whether Berkshire would give money to a
short-seller: “The answer to your question is NO.  We don’t like trading agony for money.”
My ‘Too Hard’ Pile
 On
whether the US airline industry is finally worth investing in, despite Buffett’s
well-known aversion to it (a question that was asked by Bill Miller, famed for his
15 year “streak” of outperforming the S&P 500 at Legg Mason): “It goes into
my ‘too hard’ pile.”
The More Bankers Want to Be
Less Like Bankers, the Less I Like It
 On the US banking industry: “I’m a little less optimistic about the banking
system longer term than you are… I do not see why massive derivative books
should be mixed up with insured banks… The more bankers want to be less like
bankers, the less I like it.”
 The biggest threat to US competitiveness: “The
perfectly crazy outcome” of engineering graduates going into derivatives at
banks.
Everlasting Learning
 On whether Berkshire will get involved in
helping its businesses manage their responsibilities under Obamacare: “We like
that kind of decision being made near the firing line.”
 On Warren Buffett’s pondering out-loud “how
I’d do if I managed money by the math”—meaning computer screens: “You’d do it
poorly.”
 On Berkshire’s new model of buying companies
rather than managing stocks: “We’re sort of in a different mode now… If we had
stayed in our old mode we would not be so successful.  The game of life is a game of everlasting
learning.  At least if you want to win.”
 And we’ll conclude with Buffett’s comment on
that last answer from Munger: “And we want to win.”
 No kidding.

Jeff Matthews
Author “Warren Buffett’s Successor: Who It Is And Why It Matters”
(eBooks on Investing, 2013)    $2.99
Kindle Version at Amazon.com
 

© 2013
NotMakingThisUp, LLC              
The
content contained in this blog represents only the opinions of Mr.
Matthews.   Mr. Matthews also acts as an
advisor and clients advised by Mr. Matthews may hold either long or short
positions in securities of various companies discussed in the blog based upon
Mr. Matthews’ recommendations.  This
commentary in no way constitutes investment advice, and should never be relied
on in making an investment decision, ever. 
Also, this blog is not a solicitation of business by Mr. Matthews: all
inquiries will be ignored.  And if you
think Mr. Matthews is kidding about that, he is not.  The content herein is intended solely for the
entertainment of the reader, and the author.
Categories
Uncategorized

England Before Thatcher: The NotMakingThisUp Book Review of Richard Hell’s “I Dreamed I Was A Very Clean Tramp”

 Richard Hell—look him up, kids—aspired to be a
writer, became one of the originals of the 1970s New York punk scene, and is now a
writer.
 And he is a very good writer if  “I Dreamed…” is any indication.  In fact, it’s probably the best rock and roll
memoir you can find out there—and we here at NotMakingThisUp read them all (he’s not kidding—ed.)
 By way of comparison, Gregg Allman’s recent “My
Cross to Bear” is one of those as-told-to memoirs whose primary focus is
on the hair-raising amount of drug intake that ruined him (not to mention graphic details concerning the other aspect of rock and roll
that goes hand-in-hand with drugs, if you get our drift—ed
.)
 Tommy Iommi’s two-year-old “Iron Man” is a
more thoughtfully written account of the hard work (and mystical experience
during a car wreck) that helped create Black Sabbath, but without the literary
drive of Hell’s work.  
 And Clive Davis’ brand
new autobiography is interesting enough (hey, Aerosmith wrote a song about him) but annoyingly self-congratulatory
what with all the time he spends talking about how many acts he discovered who made it big in the music business (before they all seemed
to die of drug and alcohol abuse—ed
.).
 Unlike those three authors, Hell’s approach in “I Dreamed…” is to tell his
story with straightforward prose, without self-pity or self-congratulation, but
with enough self-knowledge that you trust him, as in this early, offhand
observation:
 I probably peaked as a human in the sixth
grade.  I was golden without conceit.
 Most remarkably, Hell writes in such a way
that—unlike most rock memoirs—you want to read the whole thing, from start to
finish, and not just skip around to pick out the good bits (“Where did Tommy meet
Ozzi?” for example, or “How did Gregg write ‘Whipping Post’?” or, perhaps the
most crucial question of all:  “Why
didn’t Clive want the Kinks to release ‘Come Dancing’ for crying out loud?”)
 Hell saw a lot in his fast life—toured with
the Sex Pistols, became fast friends with Dee Dee Ramone—and, heroin junkie
though he was, he remembers enough to make the storytelling worthwhile, as when he describes the night
Johnny Thunders (look him up, kids)
gave Hell 
“the most perceptive take on
professional rock and roll I’d ever heard
”:
 He compared it to prizefighting—young nowhere kids busting their skulls
in service to a fantasy of the big-time while businesspeople dole out to them
promises and little tokens, raking it in on the youths’ showings until the kids
fall out, sooner, than later, broke and brain-dead, everything burned.”
 There is more here, and it is much better told by Hell himself (we were trying to work that in somehow—ed.)  So buy this book, and read it from beginning
to end.  
 While Richard Hell and the Voidoids
will never replace the Arctic Monkeys as the house band of this virtual column, as rock memoirs go, this is as good as they come.
 Oh—about that Margaret Thatcher reference in the title.  Any time somebody tries to tell you how
Margaret Thatcher ruined a wonderful, egalitarian little island called England,
have them read this book for 
Hell’s account of what he found
when he went to England in the pre-Thatcher mid-1970s, for a tour with the Sex
Pistols:
 England made a bad impression.  It seemed defeated and ashamed.  Its more privileged youth manifested this in
continuous cynical, self-deprecating irony. 
Older people were still fixated, amazingly, on World War II, which was
apparently the most recent moment in which they could take any pride.  Everyone still seemed psychologically crushed
by the collapse of the empire fifty years before.
 Physically, it was more of the same.  The streets of the East Village were burnt
out and lawless, but they were Joyland compared to the death row oppressiveness
of urban Britain…
 For food there was fried potatoes, and
potatoes and beans, and potatoes and eggs, and meat-potato pies and boiled
potatoes.
 The country was in even worse economic shape
than New York City, without New York’s cultural compensation.  The lives of the working-class kids were
especially miserable.  There were no jobs
for them and nothing to look forward to and nothing to do but beat each other
up at soccer games.
 So get this book.  And when you read (or watch) about Margaret
Thatcher and how she ruined England, remember you’re reading (or watching)
somebody who wasn’t around back then, like Richard Hell. 
© 2013
NotMakingThisUp, LLC              
The
content contained in this blog represents only the opinions of Mr.
Matthews.   Mr. Matthews also acts as an
advisor and clients advised by Mr. Matthews may hold either long or short
positions in securities of various companies discussed in the blog based upon
Mr. Matthews’ recommendations.  This
commentary in no way constitutes investment advice, and should never be relied
on in making an investment decision, ever. 
Also, this blog is not a solicitation of business by Mr. Matthews: all
inquiries will be ignored.  And if you
think Mr. Matthews is kidding about that, he is not.  The content herein is intended solely for the
entertainment of the reader, and the author.
Categories
Uncategorized

The Best Stock-Picker I Ever Knew

 The best stock-picker I ever knew died last
week.
  
 You never heard of him.  He did not yack about his picks in Barron’s annual Roundtable or chat up his latest buy with the talking heads on CNBC, and he
certainly wasn’t posting anything on message boards—he actually didn’t use a
computer.
 In fact, he still used a rotary phone in his
house.
 The way he picked stocks was also from the
dark ages: he combed the stock tables in the Wall Street Journal, looking for a
very specific thing he liked to see in a stock.
 When he found that thing he liked to see—and
only when he found that thing—he bought the stock.
 And he never sold it.
 So when he died last week, he was sitting on a
portfolio of stocks like ExxonMobil, Altria (the old Phillip Morris), Verizon,
and all kinds of blue-chip stocks that your average CNBC stock promoter doesn’t
much care for, at cost-bases that would make your head spin, with dividend
income that paid for the houses and antiques and gee-gaws and other things he collected besides stocks.
 What, exactly, was the thing he was looking
for? 
 It was simple: it was a high dividend yield in
a company that had a long track record of paying good dividends.
 By buying companies with safe, high dividend
yields, Norman assured himself of getting only companies that had solid
financial characteristics (after all, they couldn’t have been paying dividends
for many years without a good underlying business model and strong cash flow),
at prices that were usually—in hindsight—ridiculously cheap, because Norman
generally bought them during a hysteria that was causing Mr. Market to offer
that particular stock at a particularly attractive price.

 Picky as he was, Norman bought maybe one new stock every year or two, at most.  (He made Warren Buffett look like a day-trader.) And he was loyal to his investments: he never, ever sold.  
 He bought what is now Altria back when the
government was trying to put Phillip Morris out of business around 2003-4 and
the stock was being given away.  He
bought Mobil back during the market collapse in 1987, when everything was being
given away.  And he bought things that
became Verizon back before Verizon became Verizon, when those things were being
given away because nobody understood who needed a regional phone company in
their investment portfolio.
 Idea-for-idea, Norman was the best
stock-picker I have ever known: he almost never bought a clunker. 
 But he was more than a stock-picker.  He bought houses the way he bought stocks—when
they were on sale
and he rented them to people who often became his friends, like we did.  

 And he bought the
antiques and gee-gaws that eventually filled almost every square inch of his
house and garage the way he bought stocks and houses, although he splurged a
little on objects of great beauty, because, at the end of the day, he saw
beauty where others didn’t.
 Now that I think about it, Norman picked his
friends the same way he picked stocks (and bonds) and antiques and gee-gaws,
and like those stocks (and bonds) and antiques and gee-gaws that he bought and
never, ever sold, Norman kept his friends all his life, and they stayed with
him in return.
 Our daughters first met him long ago in a dark
Victorian living room with dim lighting and old furniture and a fire in the
fireplace and hot tea on the coffee table even though they were too young to
drink tea (although they did eat the biscuits he set out), and despite the fact they only saw Norman a few times after we moved away from next door to him (“away” being three blocks, which was still too far away for Norman), they miss him.
 We all miss him.
Jeff Matthews
Author “Warren Buffett’s Successor: Who It Is And Why It Matters”
(eBooks on Investing, 2013)    $2.99
Kindle Version at Amazon.com
© 2013
NotMakingThisUp, LLC              
The
content contained in this blog represents only the opinions of Mr.
Matthews.   Mr. Matthews also acts as an
advisor and clients advised by Mr. Matthews may hold either long or short
positions in securities of various companies discussed in the blog based upon
Mr. Matthews’ recommendations.  This
commentary in no way constitutes investment advice, and should never be relied
on in making an investment decision, ever. 
Also, this blog is not a solicitation of business by Mr. Matthews: all
inquiries will be ignored.  And if you
think Mr. Matthews is kidding about that, he is not.  The content herein is intended solely for the
entertainment of the reader, and the author.
Categories
Uncategorized

“The New JCP”: Insider Sells, Chumps Buy

 The most inadvertently amusing rumor we’ve
heard since—well, since the rumor that Richard Schulze had plenty of backers to
lever up Best Buy (reported repeatedly, and wrongly, by the Minneapolis Star-Tribune, as detailed here)—was today’s breathless rumor that JC Penney was either going to be put
up for sale, or its CEO Ron Johnson, who lost his considerable Apple-related mojo
trying to turn around the aging department store chain, was going to be fired.
 Here’s how Briefing.com reported it at 3:11
p.m. E.S.T.:
 J.C.
Penney seeing pop higher on volume  (15.35 -1.38)
Move being attributed to speculation that
directors could push for sale of company or push to replace CEO.
What made this
rumor so amusing is the fact—apparently oblivious to the rumor-mongers trying
to pump up their stock—that one of the very same directors supposedly 
pushing for sale of the company had just sold 10 million shares of his
company’s JC Penney stock in a “get-me-out” kind of trade you don’t see very
often, especially from insiders. 
 According to Bloomberg, Deutsche Bank handled
the block after market close last night for Vornado, whose CEO, Steven Roth, is one of the JC Penney directors most responsible for bringing in Ron Johnson in the first place.  (And they handled it very well, at that, getting $16.40 for shares whose
last trade on today’s close was not quite $15.)
 What makes the Vornado sale even more
interesting than just being a honking big insider sale is that Roth’s presence on the JC Penney board provided support to JC
Penney’s shares through all the ups and downs (mostly downs) of its turnaround.
 After all, with Vornado one of its biggest shareholders and Roth one of its biggest-mouthed and most money-making directors, Penney shareholders could ignore $4 billion of annual
sales and $2 billion of gross profit dollars evaporating while customers fled
to Macy’s and Target, by daydreaming about a happy ending: to whit, that JC Penney would turn itself into a high-P/E REIT like Vornado, and shareholders would live happily ever after.
 One more thing that made the sale interesting is that Vornado didn’t need to sell.  This
wasn’t a margin call like the Bass Brothers’ sale of Disney stock a couple
decades back (look it up, kids), or, more recently, Aubrey McLendon’s 2008
margin call in Chesapeake.  No, Vornado
appears to have wanted to sell.
 Now, we here at NotMakingThisUp don’t think
the whole story at JC Penney (or “JCP” as its new overseers mistakenly took to
calling it in ads despite the fact that the target JC Penney customer has no
notion of stock tickers) is that Ron Johnson alienated a whole
bunch of customers, many of whom may never come back.  We think the whole story would also take a hard
look at what happened before he arrived, and how, exactly, the previous management team ran the thing before Ron
Johnson even walked in the door (big on share repurchases for Wall Street types, short on reinvestment in the business for the customers).
 Still, the idea that JC Penney will now be
sold—after a key insider, who would probably know if something was brewing, takeover-wise, blew out 10 million shares of stock—makes this the
most amusing rumor we’re heard since the Best Buy nonsense.
 What we really have here is a case of massive insider
selling, and what looks like chumps buying.  
 And a whole lot of ‘em, at that.
Jeff Matthews
Author “Secrets in Plain Sight: Business and Investing Secrets of Warren
Buffett”
(eBooks on Investing, 2012)   
Available now at Amazon.com
© 2013
NotMakingThisUp, LLC
                                   
The
content contained in this blog represents only the opinions of Mr.
Matthews.   Mr. Matthews also acts as an
advisor and clients advised by Mr. Matthews may hold either long or short
positions in securities of various companies discussed in the blog based upon
Mr. Matthews’ recommendations.  This
commentary in no way constitutes investment advice, and should never be relied
on in making an investment decision, ever. 
Also, this blog is not a solicitation of business by Mr. Matthews: all
inquiries will be ignored.  And if you
think Mr. Matthews is kidding about that, he is not.  The content herein is intended solely for the
entertainment of the reader, and the author.
Categories
Uncategorized

Buffett’s Lament; or, Don’t Let The “Uncle Warren” Stuff Fool You

  Well Warren Buffett’s latest chairman’s
letter is out, and it is, in a word, boring.
  But
boring in a good way.
 
  Unlike two years ago,
when a supposed successor to Buffett’s throne flamed out (
spectacularly—ed.) and last year, when Buffett finally announced
that there was indeed an identified, board-approved successor (
for more on this see
“Warren Buffett’s Successor: Who It Is And Why It Matters,” just out on
Kindle—ed.
), there are no dramas this year.  Just a lot of good news.
 He tells us the biggest profit engines at Berkshire—the railroad and the energy
utilities—are growing nicely and sucking up a lot of cash destined to earn a
very decent return, which makes Buffett happy.
 
(Anybody else notice the railroad
now carries “15% of all inter-city freight in the US,” according to
Buffett—distinctly higher than the 11% figure he quoted two years ago?—ed.)
  And most of the smaller businesses—from boxed-chocolate
maker See’s Candies to McLane, a distributor of everything from beer and wine
to gum (
it also happens to be the largest
tobacco distributor in the US, despite Buffett’s revulsion towards that product—ed.
)
seem to be doing fine, too, although Buffett says next to nothing about them.
 
 Rather, he can’t wait to talk up his two
eventual replacements as Chief Investment Officer at Berkshire, Todd Combs and Ted
Weschler, who each beat the S&P 500 by over 10% in 2012, which “left me in
the dust,” Buffett complained (
in a humorous way
—ed.)
 Also, the insurance businesses, which constitute the heart
if not the soul of Berkshire Hathaway, “shot the lights out,” in Buffett’s words.

 Plus he gives the usual shout-outs to
various Berkshire managers, not to mention the usual self-reproach for seeming
‘bad’ news—which in this year’s letter starts with the disclosure that
Berkshire didn’t outperform his standard measuring stick, the S&P
500, resulting in the bizarre circumstance of a CEO whose company increased its
after-tax net worth by $24 billion calling the numbers “subpar.”
  He predictably griped about not bagging any
major acquisition “elephants” as hoped (
although
he did snag Heinz after the year finished—ed
.) and gave his 
standard and
oft-repeated “America’s best days are ahead of us” cheerleader pitch (
including the normal sniping at lesser CEOs—ed.).
 There is also a classic Buffett primer on the merits (actually,
in this case, demerits—ed.
) of paying dividends; as well as a long and
unconvincing defense of his recent, renewed foray into newspapers (
to paraphrase, ‘it isn’t costing us much,
and by gosh it’s good for America’—ed.
).

 But the best part of the letter—the part
that gives the reader the greatest insight into the mind of Warren E. Buffett—is
not the railroad stuff or the insurance stuff or even the invitation to host “a
credentialed bear on Berkshire, preferably one who is short the stock,” in
order to “spice up” the Q&A session at the Berkshire shareholder meeting (
poor
bastard—ed
.
).
 No, the best part of the letter is Buffett’s
lament that his record of beating the S&P 500 over five-year periods, which
he first brought up in the 2011 letter, is endangered:
 “To
date, we’ve never had a five-year period of underperformance, having managed 43
times to surpass the S&P over such a stretch… But the S&P has now had
gains in each of the last four years, outpacing us over that period.  If the market continues to advance in 2013,
our streak of five-year wins will end.”
  The fact that a guy who, with the help of
Charlie Munger’s key insight on the importance of buying good businesses rather
than cheap stocks as well as the hard work over many years by a lot of
smart managers who could have made themselves far richer working
on their own, has compounded the net worth of a company 19.7% a year for 48
years (
when you compound something nearly
20% a year for 48 years, it adds up to a lot…like, 586,817%—ed
.) worries about a 43 period “streak” of five-year wins against the overall stock market,
tells you everything you need to know about what it takes to create a track
record like Warren Buffett (
a flat-out
competitive instinct that never quits—ed
.)
 So don’t let the “Uncle Warren” veneer fool
you.  He set out to be the richest man in
the world, and he made it, but not by sitting back and spouting homespun
pearls of wisdom: it was by outworking—and outthinking—everybody else.
 And doing that every day, of every week, of every year.
Jeff Matthews
Author “Warren Buffett’s Successor: Who It Is And Why It Matters”
(eBooks on Investing, 2013)    $2.99
Kindle Version at Amazon.com
© 2012
NotMakingThisUp, LLC              
The
content contained in this blog represents only the opinions of Mr.
Matthews.   Mr. Matthews also acts as an
advisor and clients advised by Mr. Matthews may hold either long or short
positions in securities of various companies discussed in the blog based upon
Mr. Matthews’ recommendations.  This
commentary in no way constitutes investment advice, and should never be relied
on in making an investment decision, ever. 
Also, this blog is not a solicitation of business by Mr. Matthews: all
inquiries will be ignored.  And if you
think Mr. Matthews is kidding about that, he is not.  The content herein is intended solely for the
entertainment of the reader, and the author.